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Review of Law & Economics

Editor-in-Chief: Parisi, Francesco

Ed. by Cooter, Robert D. / Gómez Pomar, Fernando / Kornhauser, Lewis A. / Parchomovsky, Gideon / Engel, Christoph

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Volume 13, Issue 1


Estimating Judicial Ideal Points in Latin America: The Case of Argentina

Juan González Bertomeu / Lucia Dalla Pellegrina
  • Corresponding author
  • Department of Economics, Management and Statistics (DEMS), University of Milano-Bicocca, Italy
  • Other articles by this author:
  • De Gruyter OnlineGoogle Scholar
/ Nuno Garoupa
Published Online: 2016-07-02 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2015-0040


This paper presents an estimation of ideal points for the Justices of the Supreme Court of Argentina for 1984–2007. The estimated ideal points allow us to focus on political cycles in the Court as well as possible coalitions based on presidential appointments. We find strong evidence to support the existence of such coalitions in some periods (such as President Carlos Menem’s term) but less so in others (including President Néstor Kirchner’s term, a period of swift turnover in the Court due to impeachment processes and resignations). Implications for comparative judicial politics are discussed.

Keywords: constitutional court; constitutional review; empirical analysis; ideal point; Argentina


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About the article

Published Online: 2016-07-02

Published in Print: 2017-03-01

Citation Information: Review of Law & Economics, Volume 13, Issue 1, 20150040, ISSN (Online) 1555-5879, ISSN (Print) 2194-6000, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2015-0040.

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