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Review of Network Economics

Editor-in-Chief: Grzybowski, Lukasz

Ed. by Briglauer, Wolfgang / Goetz, Georg / Pereira, Pedro

4 Issues per year


IMPACT FACTOR 2017: 0.357
5-year IMPACT FACTOR: 0.894

CiteScore 2017: 0.64

SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2017: 0.315
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2017: 0.770

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1446-9022
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Volume 11, Issue 3

Issues

Equilibrium Selection in Network Coordination Games: An Experimental Study

Vincenz Frey / Rense Corten / Vincent Buskens
Published Online: 2012-09-12 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/1446-9022.1365

Abstract

We experimentally study equilibrium selection in repeated coordination games played on networks. We test predictions from three competing theories. In line with payoff-dominance as a deductive selection principle, experienced subjects coordinate on the payoff-dominant (but risk-dominated) equilibrium. Groups of inexperienced subjects reach coordination through adaptive dynamics, with the likelihood of convergence to the payoff-dominant equilibrium not depending on the network structure. Subjects’ reactions to deviations from an established equilibrium challenge the proposition that decision noise favors coordination on the risk-dominant equilibrium.

Keywords: coordination; convention; risk dominance; Pareto-ranked equilibria; network effects; stochastic stability

About the article

Published Online: 2012-09-12


Citation Information: Review of Network Economics, Volume 11, Issue 3, ISSN (Online) 1446-9022, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/1446-9022.1365.

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©2012 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston.Get Permission

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