Review of Network Economics
Editor-in-Chief: Grzybowski, Lukasz
Ed. by Briglauer, Wolfgang / Goetz, Georg / Pereira, Pedro
4 Issues per year
IMPACT FACTOR 2017: 0.357
5-year IMPACT FACTOR: 0.894
CiteScore 2017: 0.64
SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2017: 0.315
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2017: 0.770
Equilibrium Selection in Network Coordination Games: An Experimental Study
We experimentally study equilibrium selection in repeated coordination games played on networks. We test predictions from three competing theories. In line with payoff-dominance as a deductive selection principle, experienced subjects coordinate on the payoff-dominant (but risk-dominated) equilibrium. Groups of inexperienced subjects reach coordination through adaptive dynamics, with the likelihood of convergence to the payoff-dominant equilibrium not depending on the network structure. Subjects’ reactions to deviations from an established equilibrium challenge the proposition that decision noise favors coordination on the risk-dominant equilibrium.
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