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Review of Network Economics

Editor-in-Chief: Grzybowski, Lukasz

Ed. by Goetz, Georg / Pereira, Pedro

IMPACT FACTOR 2018: 0.080
5-year IMPACT FACTOR: 0.803

CiteScore 2018: 0.39

SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2018: 0.941
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2018: 0.182

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Volume 11, Issue 4


Resource Adequacy: Should Regulators Worry?

Hernan D. Bejarano / Lance Clifner / Carl Johnston / Stephen Rassenti / Vernon L. Smith
Published Online: 2012-12-12 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/1446-9022.1391


Regulators have proposed various institutional alternatives to secure network resource adequacy and reasonably priced electric power for consumers. These alternatives prompt many difficult questions: Does the development of Demand Response reduce the need for new capacity? How effectively can a government-mandated Capacity Market foster efficient investment? How does centralized generator commitment (with revenue guarantees) compare to a system in which Generators voluntarily commit themselves with no revenue guarantees? If exclusive distribution contracts were replaced by unregulated retail competition, what would be the effects on investment and market prices? We use laboratory experiments to address these questions.

Keywords: electric power networks; resource adequacy; capacity markets; demand response; retail competition; central commitment

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Published Online: 2012-12-12

Citation Information: Review of Network Economics, Volume 11, Issue 4, ISSN (Online) 1446-9022, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/1446-9022.1391.

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©2012 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston.Get Permission

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