*Abreu*, *J. F.* and *M. A.* *Gulamhussen* (2013): The Stock Market Reaction to the Public Announcement of a Supranational List of Too-Big-To-Fail Banks during the Financial Crisis, Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money 25, 49–72. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Acharya*, *V. V.* (2009): A Theory of Systemic Risk and Design of Prudential Bank Regulation, Journal of Financial Stability 5(3), 224–255. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Acharya*, *V. V.*, *R. F.* *Engle* and *M.* *Richardson* (2012): Capital Shortfall: A New Approach to Ranking and Regulating Systemic Risks, The American Economic Review 102(3), 59–64. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Acharya*, *V. V.*, *L. H.* *Pedersen*, *T.* *Philippon* and *M.* *Richardson* (2010): Measuring Systemic Risk, NYU Stern Working Papers. Google Scholar

*Acharya*, *V. V.*, *L. H.* *Pedersen*, *T.* *Philippon* and *M.* *Richardson* (2017): Measuring Systemic Risk, Review of Financial Studies 30(1), 2–47. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Adrian*, *T.* and *M. K.* *Brunnermeier* (2008): CoVaR., Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports 348. Google Scholar

*Adrian*, *T.* and *M. K.* *Brunnermeier* (2016): CoVaR, American Economic Review 106(7), 1705–1741. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Arinaminpathy*, *N.*, *S.* *Kapadia* and *R. M.* *May* (2012): Size and Complexity in Model Financial Systems, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 109(45), 18338–18343. PubMedCrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Baele*, *L.*, *O. D.* *Jonghe* and *R.* *Vander Vennet* (2007): Does the Stock Market Value Bank Diversification? Journal of Banking & Finance 31(7), 1999–2023. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Balla*, *E.*, *I.* *Ergen* and *M.* *Migueis* (2014): Tail Dependence and Indicators of Systemic Risk for Large US Depositories, Journal of Financial Stability 15, 195–209. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Bandt*, *O. D.* and *P.* *Hartmann* (2000): Systemic Risk: A Survey, ECB Working Paper 35. Google Scholar

*Banulescu*, *G.-D.* and *E.-I.* *Dumitrescu* (2015): Which are the SIFIs?: A Component Expected Shortfall Approach to Systemic Risk, Journal of Banking & Finance 50, 575–588. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Barth*, *J. R.* and *C.* *Wihlborg* (2016): Too Big to Fail and Too Big to Save: Dilemmas for Banking Reform, National Institute Economic Review 235(1), R27–R39. Google Scholar

*BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION* (2013): Global systemically important banks: updated assessment methodology and the higher loss absorbency requirement. Google Scholar

*Battiston*, *S.*, *D. D.* *Gatti*, *M.* *Gallegati*, *B.* *Greenwald* and *J. E.* *Stiglitz* (2012): Default Cascades: When Does Risk Diversification Increase Stability?, Journal of Financial Stability 8(3), 138–149. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Benoit*, *S.*, *G.* *Colletaz* and *C.* *Hurlin* (2013): A Theoretical and Empirical Comparison of Systemic Risk Measures: MES versus CoVaR. Google Scholar

*Benoit*, *S.*, *J.-E.* *Colliard*, *C.* *Hurlin* and *C.* *Pérignon* (2017): Where the Risks Lie: A Survey on Systemic Risk, Review of Finance 21(1), 109–152. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Bertay*, *A. C.*, *A.* *Demirgüç-Kunt* and *H.* *Huizinga* (2013): Do We Need Big Banks?: Evidence on Performance, Strategy and Market Discipline, Journal of Financial Intermediation 22(4), 532–558. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Bisias*, *D.*, *M.* *Flood*, *A. W.* *Lo* and*S.**Valavanis* (2012): A Survey of Systemic Risk Analytics, Annual Review of Financial Economics 4(1), 255–296. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Bluhm*, *M.* and *J. P.* *Krahnen* (2014): Systemic Risk in an Interconnected Banking System with Endogenous Asset Markets, Journal of Financial Stability 13, 75–94. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Bongini*, *P.*, *L.* *Nieri* and *M. Pelagatti* (2015): The Importance of Being Systemically Important Financial Institutions, Journal of Banking & Finance 50, 562–574. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Boyd*, *J. H.* and *A.* *Heitz* (2016): The Social Costs and Benefits of Too-Big-To-Fail Banks: A “Bounding” Exercise, Journal of Banking & Finance 68, 251–265. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Brownlees*, *C. T.* and *R. F.* *Engle* (2012): Volatility, correlation and tails for systemic risk measurement. Google Scholar

*Brownlees*, *C. T.* and *R. F.* *Engle* (2016): SRISK: A Conditional Capital Shortfall Measure of Systemic Risk, Review of Financial Studies 30(1), 48–79. Google Scholar

*Brunnermeier*, *M. K.*, *G. Dong* and *D. Palia* (2012): Banks’ Non-Interest Income and Systemic Risk, Paper presented at the AFA 2012 Chicago Meeting. Google Scholar

*Buch*, *C. M.*, *T.* *Krause* and *L.* *Tonzer* (2017): Drivers of systemic risk: Do national and European perspectives differ? Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper 09/2017. Google Scholar

*Caccioli*, *F.*, *T. A.* *Catanach* and *J. D.* *Farmer* (2012): Heterogeneity, Correlations and Financial Contagion, Advances in Complex Systems 15 Suppl. No. 2, 1250058–1–1250058–15. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Castro*, *C.* and *S.* *Ferrari* (2014): Measuring and Testing for the Systemically Important Financial Institutions, Journal of Empirical Finance 25, 1–14. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Cubillas*, *E.*, *A. I.* *Fernández* and *F.* *González* (2017): How Credible Is a Too-Big-To-Fail Policy?: International Evidence from Market Discipline, Journal of Financial Intermediation 29, 46–67. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Dam*, *L.* and *M.* *Koetter* (2012): Bank Bailouts and Moral Hazard: Evidence from Germany, Review of Financial Studies 25(8), 2343–2380. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Danielsson*, *J. O. N.*, *K. R.* *James*, *M.* *Valenzuela* and *I.* *Zer* (2016): Can We Prove A Bank Guilty of Creating Systemic Risk?: A Minority Report, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 48(4), 795–812. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Demirgüç-Kunt*, *A.* and *H.* *Huizinga* (2013): Are Banks Too Big to Fail or Too Big to Save?: International Evidence from Equity Prices and CDS Spreads, Journal of Banking & Finance 37(3), 875–894. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Dermine*, *J.* and *D.* *Schoenmaker* (2010): In Banking, Is Small Beautiful? Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments 19(1), 1–19. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Ellis*, *L.*, *A.* *Haldane* and *F.* *Moshirian* (2014): Systemic Risk, Governance and Global Financial Stability, Journal of Banking & Finance 45, 175–181. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD* (2010): Reducing the moral hazard posed by systemically important financial institutions: FSB Recommendations and Time Lines. Google Scholar

*FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD* (2014): Structural Banking Reforms. Cross-border consistencies and global financial stability implications: Report to G20 Leaders for the November 2014 Summit. Google Scholar

*Freixas*, *X.* and *J.-C.* *Rochet* (2013): Taming Systemically Important Financial Institutions, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 45 Suppl. No. 1, 37–58. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Gandhi*, *P.* and *H.* *Lustig* (2015): Size Anomalies in U.S. Bank Stock Returns, The Journal of Finance 70(2), 733–768. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Goldstein*, *M.* and *N.* *Véron* (2011): Too Big to Fail: The Transatlantic Debate, Peterson Institute for International Economics Working Paper Series WP 11–2. Google Scholar

*Gong*, *N.* and *K. D.* *Jones* (2013): Bailouts, Monitoring, and Penalties: An Integrated Framework of Government Policies to Manage the Too-Big-To-Fail Problem, International Review of Finance 13(3), 299–325. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Gravelle*, *T.* and *F.* *Li* (2013): Measuring Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions: An Extreme Value Theory Approach, Journal of Banking & Finance 37(7), 2196–2209. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*He*, *F.* and *X.* *Chen* (2016): Credit Networks and Systemic Risk of Chinese Local Financing Platforms: Too Central or Too Big to Fail?, Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and Its Applications 461, 158–170. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Helwege*, *J.* (2010): Financial Firm Bankruptcy and Systemic Risk, Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money 20(1), 1–12. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Hovakimian*, *A.*, *E. J.* *Kane* and *L.* *Laeven* (2012): Variation in Systemic Risk at US Banks during 1974–2010, NBER Working Paper No. 18043. Google Scholar

*Huang, X., H. Zhou and H. Zhu* (2012): Assessing the Systemic Risk of a Heterogeneous Portfolio of Banks during the Recent Financial Crisis, Journal of Financial Stability 8(3), 193–205. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Inanoglu*, *H.*, *M.* *Jacobs*, *J.* *Liu* and *R.* *Sickles* (2015): Analyzing Bank Efficiency: Are “Too-Big-To-Fail” Banks Efficient?, in: *E.* *Haven*, *P.* *Molyneux*, *J. O. S.* *Wilson*, *S.* *Fedotov* and *M.* *Duygun* (eds.) The Handbook of Post Crisis Financial Modeling. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 110–146. Google Scholar

*Jonghe*, *O. D.* (2010): Back to the Basics in Banking?: A Micro-Analysis of Banking System Stability, Journal of Financial Intermediation 19(3), 387–417. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Jonghe*, *O. D.*, *M.* *Diepstraten* and *G.* *Schepens* (2015): Banks’ Size, Scope and Systemic Risk: What Role for Conflicts of Interest?, Journal of Banking & Finance 61, S3–S13. Google Scholar

*Kaufman*, *G. G.* (2002): Too Big to Fail in Banking: What Remains?, The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 42(3), 426–436. Google Scholar

*Kaufman*, *G. G.* (2003): Too Big to Fail in U.S. Banking: Quo Vadis? Google Scholar

*Kaufman*, *G. G.* (2014): Too Big to Fail in Banking: What Does It Mean? Journal of Financial Stability 13, 214–223. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Keister*, *T.* (2016): Bailouts and Financial Fragility, The Review of Economic Studies 83(2), 704–736. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Kleinow*, *J.*, *F.* *Moreira*, *S.* *Strobl* and *S.* *Vähämaa* (2017): Measuring Systemic Risk: A Comparison of Alternative Market-Based Approaches, Finance Research Letters 21, 40–46. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Knaup*, *M.* and *W.* *Wagner* (2010): Measuring the tail risks of banks, Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research on Trade Regulation Working Paper 2009/14. Google Scholar

*Knot*, *K. H. W.* and *H.* *Van Voorden* (2013): Systemically Important Banks – Possible Options for Policy Makers, in: *A.* *Dombret* and *O.* *Lucius* (eds.) Stability of the Financial System. Illusion or Feasible Concept?. Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 288–309. Google Scholar

*Krause*, *A.* and *S.* *Giansante* (2012): Interbank Lending and the Spread of Bank Failures: A Network Model of Systemic Risk, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 83(3), 583–608. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Laeven*, *L.*, *L.* *Ratnovski* and *H.* *Tong* (2014): Bank size and systemic risk, International Monetary Fund Staff Discussion Note 14/04. Google Scholar

*Laeven*, *L.*, *L.* *Ratnovski* and *H.* *Tong* (2016): Bank Size, Capital, and Systemic Risk: Some International Evidence, Journal of Banking & Finance 69 Suppl. 1, S25–S34. Google Scholar

*Leaders of the Group of Twenty* (2009a): London summit – Leaders’ statement: 2 April 2009. Google Scholar

*Leaders of the Group of Twenty* (2009b): Leaders’ statement: The Pittsburgh summit: September 24–25, 2009. Google Scholar

*López-Espinosa*, *G.*, *A.* *Moreno*, *A.* *Rubia* and *L.* *Valderrama* (2012): Short-Term Wholesale Funding and Systemic Risk: A Global CoVaR Approach, Journal of Banking & Finance 36(12), 3150–3162. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*López-Espinosa*, *G.*, *A.* *Rubia*, *L.* *Valderrama* and *M.* *Antón* (2013): Good for One, Bad for All: Determinants of Individual versus Systemic Risk, Journal of Financial Stability 9(3), 287–299. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Lu*, *J.* and *X.* *Hu* (2014): Novel Three-Bank Model for Measuring the Systemic Importance of Commercial Banks, Economic Modelling 43, 238–246. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Mester*, *L. J.* (2010): Scale Economies in Banking and Financial Regulatory Reform, The Region 24, 10–13. Google Scholar

*Moenninghoff*, *S. C.*, *S.* *Ongena* and *A.* *Wieandt* (2015): The Perennial Challenge to Counter Too-Big-To-Fail in Banking: Empirical Evidence from the New International Regulation Dealing with Global Systemically Important Banks, Journal of Banking & Finance 61, 221–236. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Molyneux*, *P.*, *K.* *Schaeck* and *T. M.* *Zhou* (2014): ‘Too Systemically Important to Fail’ in Banking – Evidence from Bank Mergers and Acquisitions, Journal of International Money and Finance 49, 258–282. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Mullineux*, *A.* (2014): Banking for the Public Good, International Review of Financial Analysis 36, 87–94. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Nitschka*, *T.* (2016): Is There a Too-Big-To-Fail Discount in Excess Returns on German Banks’ Stocks?, International Finance 19(3), 292–310. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Pais*, *A.* and *P. A.* *Stork* (2013): Bank Size and Systemic Risk, European Financial Management 19(3), 429–451. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Pop*, *A.* and *D.* *Pop* (2009): Requiem for Market Discipline and the Specter of TBTF in Japanese Banking, The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 49(4), 1429–1459. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Puzanova*, *N.* and *K.* *Düllmann* (2013): Systemic Risk Contributions: A Credit Portfolio Approach, Journal of Banking & Finance 37(4), 1243–1257. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Rose*, *A. K.* and *T.* *Wieladek* (2012): Too Big to Fail: Some Empirical Evidence on the Causes and Consequences of Public Banking Interventions in the UK, Journal of International Money and Finance 31(8), 2038–2051. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Segoviano*, *M. A.* and *C.* *Goddhart* (2009): Banking Stability Measures, IMF Working Paper 09/4. Google Scholar

*Silva*, *W.*, *H.* *Kimura* and *V. A.* *Sobreiro* (2017): An Analysis of the Literature on Systemic Financial Risk: A Survey, Journal of Financial Stability 28, 91–114. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Smaga*, *P.* (2013): Assessing Involvement of Central Banks in Financial Stability, Center for Financial Stability Policy Paper. Google Scholar

*Stern*, *G. H.* and *R. J.* *Feldman* (2004): Too Big to Fail: The Hazards of Bank Bailouts. Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC. Google Scholar

*Tarashev*, *N.*, *K.* *Tsatsaronis* and *C.* *Borio* (2016): Risk Attribution Using the Shapley Value: Methodology and Policy Applications, Review of Finance 20(3), 1189–1213. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Ueda*, *K.* and *B.* *Weder Di Mauro* (2013): Quantifying Structural Subsidy Values for Systemically Important Financial Institutions, Journal of Banking & Finance 37(10), 3830–3842. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Vallascas*, *F.* and *K.* *Keasey* (2012): Bank Resilience to Systemic Shocks and the Stability of Banking Systems: Small Is Beautiful, Journal of International Money and Finance 31(6), 1745–1776. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Vanhoose*, D. D. (2011): Systemic risks and macroprudential bank regulation: A critical appraisal, Networks Financial Institute at Indiana State University Policy Brief 2011-PB-04. Google Scholar

*Vlahović*, *A.* (2014): Challenges to the Implementation of a New Framework for Safeguarding Financial Stability, Journal of Central Banking Theory and Practice 3(3), 19–52. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Völz*, *M.* and *M.* *Wedow* (2011): Market Discipline and Too-Big-To-Fail in the CDS Market: Does Banks’ Size Reduce Market Discipline?, Journal of Empirical Finance 18(2), 195–210. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Wagner*, *W.* (2010): Diversification at Financial Institutions and Systemic Crises, Journal of Financial Intermediation 19(3), 373–386. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Walter*, *I.* (2009): Economic Drivers of Structural Change in the Global Financial Services Industry, Long Range Planning 42(5–6), 588–613. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Weiß*, *G. N. F.*, *D.* *Bostandzic* and *S.* *Neumann* (2014a): What Factors Drive Systemic Risk during International Financial Crises?, Journal of Banking & Finance 41, 78–96. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Weiß*, *G. N. F.* and *J.* *Mühlnickel* (2014): Why Do Some Insurers Become Systemically Relevant?, Journal of Financial Stability 13, 95–117. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Weiß*, *G. N. F.*, *S.* *Neumann* and *D.* *Bostandzic* (2014b): Systemic Risk and Bank Consolidation: International Evidence, Journal of Banking & Finance 40, 165–181. CrossrefGoogle Scholar

*Zhou*, *C.* (2009): Are Banks Too Big to Fail?: Measuring Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions, DNB Working Paper 232. Google Scholar

## Comments (0)

General note:By using the comment function on degruyter.com you agree to our Privacy Statement. A respectful treatment of one another is important to us. Therefore we would like to draw your attention to our House Rules.