Skip to content
Licensed Unlicensed Requires Authentication Published by De Gruyter March 19, 2010

Nominalism and Causal Theories of Reference

  • Jeffrey W. Roland
From the journal SATS

Abstract

According to contemporary nominalism, there are no abstracta. A common way of arguing against the existence of abstracta deploys a causal theory of reference. In short, we have no good reason to believe in what we cannot refer to and, since reference is causal and abstracta are causally isolated, we cannot refer to abstracta. In this paper, I examine just how far this sort of argument takes nominalism.

Published Online: 2010-03-19
Published in Print: 2009-November

© Philosophia Press 2008

Downloaded on 28.3.2024 from https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/SATS.2009.51/html
Scroll to top button