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The Downward Causality and the Hard Problem of Consciousness or Why Computer Programs Do not Work in the Dark

Alexander Boldachev
Published Online: 2015-01-31 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/sh-2015-0002


Any low-level processes, the sequence of chemical interactions in a living cell, muscle cellular activity, processor commands or neuron interaction, is possible only if there is a downward causality, only due to uniting and controlling power of the highest level. Therefore, there is no special “hard problem of consciousness”, i.e. the problem of relation of ostensibly purely biological materiality and non-causal mentality - we have only the single philosophical problem of relation between the upward and downward causalities, the problem of interrelation between hierarchic levels of existence. It is necessary to conclude that the problem of determinacy of chemical processes by the biological ones and the problem of neuron interactions caused by consciousness are of one nature and must have one solution.

Keywords:: consciousness; hard problem; downward causality


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  • 3. Boldachev, A.V. Temporality and the philosophy of absolute relativism, Moscow: Lenand, 2011 (in Russian).Google Scholar

About the article

Published Online: 2015-01-31

Citation Information: Studia Humana, Volume 3, Issue 4, Pages 7–10, ISSN (Online) 2299-0518, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/sh-2015-0002.

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© 2015 Alexander Boldachev. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. BY-NC-ND 3.0

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