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World Political Science

Ed. by Dvorakova, Vladimira / Cardinal, Linda

2 Issues per year


Cite Score 2016: 0.24

SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2016: 0.140
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2016: 0.452

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2363-4782
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Decision Costs and Welfare Effects of Democratic Voting Rules: an Experimental Analysis

Ulrich Glassmann
  • Corresponding author
  • Department of Political Science, University of Cologne, P.O. Box 411020, 50870 Cologne, Germany
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/ Jan Sauermann
Published Online: 2012-09-10 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/wpsr-2012-0008

Abstract

What impact do majority rule and unanimity rule have on welfare and decision costs? According to Buchanan and Tullock ([1962] 1999) the unanimity principle must be regarded as a democratic norm, because it guarantees Pareto-efficient welfare effects. We present experimental results from a public goods game, which demonstrate in contrast to this assumption that majority rule can produce greater welfare effects than unanimity rule. This result suggests a critical revision of theoretical approaches which narrow the legiti­macy of majority rule in this respect.

Keywords: common good; decision costs; laboratory experiment; majority rule; unanimity rule

About the article

Corresponding author: Ulrich Glassmann, Department of Political Science, University of Cologne, P.O. Box 411020, 50870 Cologne, Germany, Phone: +49 221 470 2853, Fax: +49 221 470 7447


Published Online: 2012-09-10


Citation Information: World Political Science, ISSN (Online) 2363-4782, ISSN (Print) 2363-4774, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/wpsr-2012-0008.

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©2012 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston. Copyright Clearance Center

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