World Political Science
Ed. by Cardinal, Linda / Dvorakova, Vladimira
2 Issues per year
CiteScore 2017: 0.28
SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2017: 0.211
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2017: 0.143
Decision Costs and Welfare Effects of Democratic Voting Rules: an Experimental Analysis
What impact do majority rule and unanimity rule have on welfare and decision costs? According to Buchanan and Tullock ( 1999) the unanimity principle must be regarded as a democratic norm, because it guarantees Pareto-efficient welfare effects. We present experimental results from a public goods game, which demonstrate in contrast to this assumption that majority rule can produce greater welfare effects than unanimity rule. This result suggests a critical revision of theoretical approaches which narrow the legitimacy of majority rule in this respect.