World Political Science
Ed. by Dvorakova, Vladimira / Cardinal, Linda
2 Issues per year
Cite Score 2016: 0.24
SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2016: 0.140
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2016: 0.452
Decision Costs and Welfare Effects of Democratic Voting Rules: an Experimental Analysis
What impact do majority rule and unanimity rule have on welfare and decision costs? According to Buchanan and Tullock ( 1999) the unanimity principle must be regarded as a democratic norm, because it guarantees Pareto-efficient welfare effects. We present experimental results from a public goods game, which demonstrate in contrast to this assumption that majority rule can produce greater welfare effects than unanimity rule. This result suggests a critical revision of theoretical approaches which narrow the legitimacy of majority rule in this respect.