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World Political Science

Ed. by Cardinal, Linda


CiteScore 2018: 0.35

SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2018: 0.207
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2018: 0.349

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2363-4782
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How to Win the Brussels Game? Explaining the European Parliament’s Success under the Co-Decision

Adam Kirpsza
  • Corresponding author
  • Institute of Political Science and International Relations, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland
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Published Online: 2018-06-02 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/wps-2018-0005

Abstract:

The purpose of the article is to identify the conditions that affect the success of the European Parliament’s amendments in the ordinary legislative procedure. In the first step, hypotheses were delineated predicting the impact of specific factors on the effectiveness of EP demands. Subsequently, they were verified using the logistic regression. The results revealed that the EP is more likely to be successful in this procedure if it applies the following negotiation techniques. First, it bundles several legislative proposals in one package. Second, it persuades the European Commission to support its amendments. Third, it negotiates the legislative proposals in trilogues. Fourth, it is cohesive during negotiations. Fifth, it prolongs negotiations with the Council until the end of parliamentary term. Sixth, it designates a rapporteur from a country acting at the same time as the Council Presidency. Seventh, it negotiates with the Council when the Presidency legislative workload is high.

Streszczenie:

Celem artykułu jest identyfikacja warunków i technik negocjacyjnych, które wpływają na sukces poprawek Parlamentu Europejskiego w zwykłej procedurze ustawodawczej. W pierwszym kroku postawiono hipotezy dotyczące wpływu określonych czynników na skuteczność postulatów PE. Następnie zweryfikowano je za pomocą regresji logistycznej. Analiza empiryczna wykazała, że jeśli Parlament Europejski chce zwiększyć skuteczność swoich poprawek w zwykłej procedurze ustawodawczej, powinien podejmować siedem działań. Po pierwsze, łączyć kilka projektów w pakiet. Po drugie, formułować swoje postulaty w taki sposób, aby uzyskać dla nich poparcie ze strony Komisji. Po trzecie, negocjować projekty legislacyjne w trialogach. Po czwarte, prezentować w negocjacjach spójne stanowisko, czyli zgłaszać poprawki popierane przez znaczną większość posłów. Po piąte, przeciągać negocjacje na okres bliski końca kadencji PE. Po szóste, desygnować na sprawozdawcę projektu posła, który pochodzi z kraju pełniącego w tym samym czasie funkcję prezydencji w Radzie. Po siódme, prowadzić negocjacje z Radą w okresie, gdy państwo pełniące prezydencję jest bardzo zapracowane.

Keywords: EU legislation; European Parliament; European Union; ordinary legislative procedure; success of EP amendments

Słowa kluczowe: Parlament Europejski; prawodawstwo UE; sukces poprawek Parlamentu Europejskiego; Unia Europejska; zwykła procedura ustawodawcza

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About the article

Published Online: 2018-06-02

Published in Print: 2018-04-25


Citation Information: World Political Science, Volume 14, Issue 1, Pages 123–144, ISSN (Online) 2363-4782, ISSN (Print) 2363-4774, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/wps-2018-0005.

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