Bestimmte Unbestimmbarkeit. Über die zweite Natur in der ersten und die erste Natur in der zweiten

Philip Hogh 1  and Julia König 2
  • 1  Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Institut für Philosophie, Frankfurt/M., Deutschland
  • 2  Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Institut für Allgemeine Erziehungswissenschaften, Frankfurt/M.


The neuroscientific naturalism poses a challenge to any philosophical attempt to determine human nature. Although the neurosciences describe the cognitive capacities of human beings as something that is socially acquired, they lack adequate reflection on the social forms in which these capacities emerge and thereby tend to naturalize not only human beings, but society as a whole. In an attempt to find alternatives to the neuroscientific naturalism, the authors refer to the traditions of Critical Theory and psychoanalysis, which enable a different understanding of human nature. This is followed by the debate between Honneth and Whitebook on the question of an anti- or pre-social self, and in reference to Adorno and Lorenzer, the authors develop a concept of second nature that allows them to adhere to the dynamics of the material nature and sociality within the human subject.

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As an open forum for discussion, Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie promotes dialog between different philosophical cultures, transcending any one school of thought. The journal primarily publishes studies that are actively engaged in modern international philosophical discourse and explore new conceptual approaches. In addition to scholarly papers, essays, interviews, and symposia, the journal presents discussions and book reviews.