Modal Realism, Counterpart Theory, and Unactualized Possibilities

Joseph A. Baltimore 1
  • 1 Department of Philosophy, West Virginia University, Morgantown, WV, USA
Joseph A. Baltimore

Abstract

It is a commonsense thesis that unactualized possibilities are not parts of actuality. To keep his modal realism in line with this thesis, David Lewis employed his indexical account of the term “actual.” I argue that the addition of counterpart theory to Lewis’s modal realism undermines his strategy for respecting the commonsense thesis. The case made here also reveals a problem for Lewis’s attempt to avoid haecceitism.

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