The Natures of Types and Tokens: On the Metaphysical Commitments of Non-Reductive Physicalism

Raphael van Riel 1
  • 1 Institute for Philosophy, University Duisburg-Essen, Essen, Germany
Raphael van Riel

Abstract

Non-reductive physicalism has become the dominant view in the philosophy of mind. Some of its metaphysical underpinnings, however, have not been studied in detail yet. The present paper suggests that non-reductive physicalism is committed to a particular view on the connection between the natures of types and the natures of their tokens – thereby defending non-reductive physicalism against an argument recently put forward by Susan Schneider.

  • Armstrong, D. M. 1980. “Against ‘Ostrich’ Nominalism: A Reply to Michael Devitt.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61:4409.

    • Crossref
    • Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Armstrong, D. M. 1989. Universals. An Opinionated Introduction. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

  • Block, N. 1997. “Anti-Reductionism Slaps Back.” Philosophical Perspectives 11:10732.

  • Mally, E. 1912. Gegenstandtheoretische Grundlagen Der Logik Und Logistik. Leipzig: Barth.

  • Parsons, T. 1980. Nonexistent Objects. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

  • Quine, W. V. O. 1960. Word and Object. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

  • Schneider, S. 2012a. “Non-Reductive Physicalism Cannot Appeal to Token-Identity.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85:71928.

    • Crossref
    • Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Schneider, S. 2012b. “Why Property Dualists Must Reject Substance Physicalism.” Philosophical Studies 175:6176.

    • Crossref
    • Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Schneider, S. 2013. “Non-Reductive Physicalism and the Mind Problem.” Nous 47:13553.

  • Schnieder, B. 2006. “A Certain Kind of Trinity: Dependence, Substance, Explanation.” Philosophical Studies 129:393419.

    • Crossref
    • Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Searle, J. 2010. Making the Social World. The Structure of Human Civilization. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    • Crossref
    • Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Thomasson, A. 1999. Fiction and Metaphysics. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

  • van Riel, R. 2012. “Pains, Pills, and Properties – Functionalism and the First-Order/Second-Order Distinction.” Dialectica 66:54362.

    • Crossref
    • Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • van Riel, R. forthcoming. The Concept of Reduction. New York: Springer.

  • Zalta, E. 1983. Abstract Objects: An Introduction to Axiomatic Metaphysics. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.

  • Zalta, E. 1988. Intensional Logic and the Metaphysics of Intentionality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Purchase article
Get instant unlimited access to the article.
$42.00
Log in
Already have access? Please log in.


or
Log in with your institution

Journal + Issues

Search