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Architecture and Design
Arts
Asian and Pacific Studies
Business and Economics
Chemistry
Classical and Ancient Near Eastern Studies
Computer Sciences
Cultural Studies
Engineering
General Interest
Geosciences
History
Industrial Chemistry
Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies
Jewish Studies
Law
Library and Information Science, Book Studies
Life Sciences
Linguistics and Semiotics
Literary Studies
Materials Sciences
Mathematics
Medicine
Music
Pharmacy
Philosophy
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Theology and Religion
Abstract
Truth is a value in that sense that a belief is correct just in case it is true, which is frequently expressed in the metaphor that beliefs aim at truth. But, what does it mean to say that beliefs aim at truth? There are three most prominent approaches to this issue: purposive (or causal), teleological (or intentional), and normative. A comprehensive discussion of these approaches is the goal of our article. We also offer the hierarchy of languages and meta-languages, which gives a fragmentary account of the concept of God’s omniscience.
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