Contemporary defenders of non-disjunctivism take a representationalist philosophy of mind for granted; all kinds of conscious intentional states/acts/events are automatically regarded as being representations. The paper presents an alternative anti-representationalist view of the mind. It differs from other present-day anti-representationalisms in arguing that all conscious phenomena contains a this-worldly something called “from-pole”, and it denies that an intentional content and the corresponding intentional object always are distinct entities. The view is set in contrast to both a transcendental ego tradition and a no from-pole tradition. Hereby, the paper defends the common sense-like view that we are persons who directly perceive, act in, and talk about things in a common world.
Jensen, R. T. 2008. “Perception and Action: An Analogical Approach.” PhD thesis, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen. http://mcc.ku.dk/staff/?id=de74f370-01ad-11de-b05e-000ea68e967b&vis=publikation)| false