Examination of Merricks’ Primitivism about Truth

A. R. J. Fisher 1
  • 1 School of Social Sciences, University of Manchester, Manchester, UK
A. R. J. Fisher

Abstract

; Truth and Ontology. Oxford: Clarendon Press) argues for and defends a novel version of primitivism about truth: being true is a primitive monadic but non-intrinsic property. This examination consists of the following triad: a critical discussion of Merricks’ argument for his view, a rejection of his objection against ; Truth, 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press) minimalist theory of truth, and a direct objection against his view on the grounds that it entails being true is a mysterious and suspicious property. The conclusion is that Merricks’ primitivism should be rejected.

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