- Published Online:
- 2014-10-21
- Published in Print:
- 2014-11-28
- Citation Information:
- Metaphysica, Volume 15, Issue 2, Pages 381–389, eISSN 1874-6373, ISSN 1437-2053, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2014-0023.
To hold that only one conscious thing is sitting in your chair, philosophers have appealed to maximality: If a property M is maximal, then anything that has property M does not have large proper parts that have property M. Philosophers have said that ordinary objects are maximal, including houses, cats, rocks, and have argued by analogy that consciousness is maximal. I argue that the maximality principle mistakenly excludes some members of a kind. Thus, it is not the correct principle to explain why, for example, you are conscious but the proper part that is all-of-you-but-your-arm is not conscious.
Bailey, A. 2014. “You Needn’t Be Simple.” Philosophical Papers 43:145–160.
Burke, M. 1994. “Dion and Theon: An Essentialist Solution to an Ancient Puzzle.” The Journal of Philosophy 91(3):129–39.
Hawley, K. 1998. “Merricks on Whether Being Conscious Is Intrinsic.” Mind 107:841–3.
Merricks, T. 1998. “Against the Doctrine of Microphysical Supervenience.” Mind 107:59–71.
Noonan, H. 1999. “Identity, Constitution, and Microphysical Supervenience.” Proceedings of the Aristototlean Society, New Series 99:273–88.
Sider, T. 2001. “Maximality and Intrinsic Properties.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63:357–64.
Sider, T. 2003. “Maximality and Microphysical Supervenience.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66:139–49.
Walsh, S. D. 2011. “Maximality, Duplication, and Intrinsic Value.” Ratio 25:311–25.
Williams, J. R. G. 2013. “Part-Intrinsicality.” Noûs 47(3):431–52.