- Published Online:
- 2015-05-02
- Published in Print:
- 2015-05-25
- Citation Information:
- Metaphysica, Volume 16, Issue 1, Pages 25–35, eISSN 1874-6373, ISSN 1437-2053, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2015-0001.
This paper concerns the ontological status of ontological categories (e.g., universal, particular, substance, property, relation, kind, object, etc.). I consider E. J. Lowe’s argument for the view that ontological categories do not exist and point out that it has some undesirable consequences for his realist ontology. I go on to argue that the main premise in Lowe’s argument – that ontological categories cannot be categorized – is false and then develop a conception of ontological categories as formal ontological kinds.
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