- Published Online:
- 2015-06-26
- Published in Print:
- 2015-09-18
- Citation Information:
- Metaphysica, Volume 16, Issue 2, Pages 195–209, eISSN 1874-6373, ISSN 1437-2053, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2015-0014.
According to Kim, events are constituted by objects exemplifying property(ies) at a time. In this paper I wish to defend Kim’s theory of events from one source of criticism, extending it by taking into account a number of ideas developed by Davidson. In particular, I shall try to avoid events proliferation – one of the most serious problems in Kim’s theory – by using a suggestion Kim himself advances, that is, by taking adverbs and the like to be events’ rather than properties’ modifiers.
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