© 2017 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston.
Architecture and Design
Arts
Asian and Pacific Studies
Business and Economics
Chemistry
Classical and Ancient Near Eastern Studies
Computer Sciences
Cultural Studies
Engineering
General Interest
Geosciences
History
Industrial Chemistry
Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies
Jewish Studies
Law
Library and Information Science, Book Studies
Life Sciences
Linguistics and Semiotics
Literary Studies
Materials Sciences
Mathematics
Medicine
Music
Pharmacy
Philosophy
Physics
Social Sciences
Sports and Recreation
Theology and Religion
Subject Areas
Architecture and Design
Arts
Asian and Pacific Studies
Business and Economics
Chemistry
Classical and Ancient Near Eastern Studies
Computer Sciences
Cultural Studies
Engineering
General Interest
Geosciences
History
Industrial Chemistry
Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies
Jewish Studies
Law
Library and Information Science, Book Studies
Life Sciences
Linguistics and Semiotics
Literary Studies
Materials Sciences
Mathematics
Medicine
Music
Pharmacy
Philosophy
Physics
Social Sciences
Sports and Recreation
Theology and Religion
Abstract
I would like to attack a certain view: the view that the concept of identity can fail to apply to some things although, for some positive integer n, we have n of them. The idea of entities without self-identity is seriously entertained in the philosophy of quantum mechanics (QM). It is so pervasive that it has been labelled the Received View (. Identity in Physics: A Historical, Philosophical, and Formal Analysis. Oxford: Oxford UP: 105). I introduce the Received View in . In I explain what I mean by “entity” (synonymously, by “object” and “thing”), and I argue that supporters of the Received View should agree with my characterization of the corresponding notion of entity (object, thing). I also explain what I mean by “identity”, and I show that supporters of the Received View agree with my characterization of that notion. In I argue that the concept of identity, so characterized, is one with the concept of oneness. Thus, it cannot but apply to what belongs to a collection with n elements, n being a positive integer. In I add some considerations on the primitiveness of identity or unity and the status of the Identity of Indiscernibles. In I address the problem of how reference to indiscernible objects with identity can be achieved.
ProCite
RefWorks
Reference Manager
BibTeX
Zotero
EndNote
-
Adams, R. 1979. “Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity.” Journal of Philosophy 76:5–26.
-
Aristotle. The Complete Works (edited by J. Barnes). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
-
Auyang, S.Y. 1995. How Is Quantum Field Theory Possible? New York: Oxford UP.
-
Baker, R.L. 1997. “Why Constitution Is Not Identity.” Journal of Philosophy 94:599–621.
-
Bencivenga, E. 2002. “Free Logics.” In Handbook of Philosophical Logic, 2nd, Vol. 5, edited by Gabbay, and Guenthner, 147–196. Dordrecht: Springer.
-
Berto, F., and M. Plebani. 2015. Ontology and Metaontology. A Contemporary Guide. London: Bloomsbury.
-
Black, M. 1952. “The Identity of Indiscernibles.” Mind 61:153–164.
-
Breckenridge, W., and O. Magidor. 2012. “Arbitrary Reference.” Philosophical Studies 158:377–400.
-
Bueno, O. 2014. “Why Identity Is Fundamental.” American Philosophical Quarterly 51:325–332.
-
Casullo, A. 1984. “The Contingent Identity of Particulars and Universals.” Mind 123:527–554.
-
Cortes, A. 1976. “Leibniz’s Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles: A False Principle.” Philosophy of Science 43:491–505.
-
Curtis, B., and H. Noonan. 2014. “Identity.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, CA. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity.
-
Dalla Chiara, M.L., and G. Toraldo Di Francia. 1993. “Individuals, Kinds and Names in Physics.” In Bridging the Gap: Philosophy, Mathematics, Physics, edited by Corsi, et al., 261–283. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
-
Deutsch, H. 1998. “Identity and General Similarity.” In Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 12, edited by Tomberlin, 117–199. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview.
-
Dirac, P.A.M. 1926. “On the Theory of Quantum Mechanics.” Proceedings of the Royal Society A112:661–677.
-
Domenech, G., and F. Holik. 2007. “A Discussion of Particle Number and Quantum Indistinguishability.” Foundations of Physics 37:855–878.
-
Dorato, M., and M. Morganti. 2013. “Grades of Individuality. A Pluralistic View of Identity in Quantum Mechanics and in the Sciences.” Philosophical Studies 163:591–610.
-
Evans, G. 1978. “Can There Be Vague Objects?.” Analysis 38:208.
-
Fine, K. 1982. “The Problem of Non-Existents, I: Internalism.” Topoi 1:97–140.
-
Fine, K. 2000. “A Counter-Example to Locke’s Thesis.” The Monist 83:357–361.
-
Fine, K. 2009. “The Question of Ontology.” In Metametaphysics, edited by Chalmers, Manley and Wasserman, 157–177. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
-
Forrest, P. 2010. “The Identity of Indiscernibles.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, CA. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-indiscernible/.
-
Frege, G. 1884. Die Grundlagen Der Arithmetik. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag. tr. The Foundations of Arithmetic, Oxford: Blackwell 1950.
-
French, S. 1995. “Hacking Away at the Identity of Indiscernibles.” The Journal of Philosophy 92:455–466.
-
French, S., and D. Krause. 2006. Identity in Physics: A Historical, Philosophical, and Formal Analysis. Oxford: Oxford UP.
-
Geach, P. 1967. “Identity.” Review Ofmetaphysics 21:3–12.
-
Greenberg, O.W., and A.M.L. Messiah. 1964. “Symmetrization Postulate and Its Experimental Foundation.” Physical Review 136B:1155–1167.
-
Haack, S. 1978. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
-
Hacking, I. 1975. “The Identity of Indiscernibles.” Journal of Philosophy 72:249–256.
-
Heidegger, M. 1957. Identity and Difference. New York: Harper & Row.
-
Hesse, M. 1970. Models and Analogies in Science. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
-
Jantzen, B.C. 2011. “No Two Entities Without Identity.” Synthèse 181:433–450.
-
Kearns, S., and O. Magidor. 2012. “Semantic Sovereignty.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85:322–350.
-
Kripke, S. 1972. “Naming and Necessity.” In Semantics of Natural Language, edited by Davidson and Harman, 253–355 and 762–9. Dordrecht: Reidel. 2nd expanded ed., Oxford: Blackwell, 1980.
-
Ladyman, J., and D. Ross. 2007. Every Thing Must Go. Metaphysics Naturalized. Oxford: Oxford UP.
-
Langton, R., and D. Lewis. 1998. “Defining ‘Intrinsic’.” In Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology, edited by Lewis, 116–132. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
-
Lewis, D. 1983. “Extrinsic Properties.” Philosophical Studies 44:197–200.
-
Lewis, D. 1986. On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.
-
Massimi, M. 2001. “Exclusion Principle and the Identity of Indiscernibles.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52:303–330.
-
Muller, F.A. 2015. “The Rise of Relationals.” Mind 124:201–237.
-
Muller, F.A., and S. Saunders. 2008. “Discerning Fermions.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59:499–508.
-
Priest, G. 2014. One. Being an Investigation into the Unity of Reality and of Its Parts, Including the Singular Object Which Is Nothingness. Oxford: Oxford UP.
-
Quine, W.V.O. 1975. “On the Individuation of Attributes.” In The Logical Enterprise, eds Anderson, Barcan and Martin. New Haven, CN: Yale UP.
-
Reichenbach, H. [1956], “The Genidentity of Quantum Particles”, repr, in Castellani (ed.) [1998], Interpreting Bodies. Classical and Quantum Objects in Modern Physics, Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP: 61-72.
-
Saunders, S. 2003. “Physics and Leibniz’s Principles.” In Symmetries in Physics: Philosophical Reflections, edited by Brading and Castellani, 289–308. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
-
Saunders, S. 2006. “Are Quantum Particles Objects.” Analysis 66:52–63.
-
Schrödinger, E. 1964. My View of the World. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
-
Schrödinger, E. 1996. Nature and the Greeks and Science and Humanism. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
-
Teller, P. 1995. An Interpretative Introduction to Quantum Field Theory. Princeton: Princeton UP.
-
Thomson, J.J. 1998. “The Statue and the Clay.” Noûs 32:149–173.
-
Toraldo Di Francia, G. 1978. “What Is a Physical Object?” Scientia 113:57–65.
-
Van Fraassen, B. 1989. Laws and Symmetry. Oxford: Oxford UP.
-
Van Fraassen, B. 1998. “The Problem of Indistinguishable Particles.” In Interpreting Bodies. Classical and Quantum Objects in Modern Physics, edited by Castellani, 73–92. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP.
-
Van Inwagen, P. 1990. Material Beings. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
-
Van Inwagen, P. 2002. “The Number of Things.” Philosophical Issues 12:176–196.
-
Varzi, A. 2000. “Mereological Commitments.” Dialectica 54:283–305.
-
Weyl, H. 1931. The Theory of Groups and Quantum Mechanics. London: Methuen & Co.
-
Wiggins, D. 2001. Sameness and Substance Renewed. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
-
Williamson, T. 1990. Identity and Discrimination. Oxford: Blackwell.
-
Williamson, T. 2007. The Philosophy of Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell.
Purchase article
Get instant unlimited access to the article.
Log in
Already have access? Please log in.
