Representation, Consciousness, and Time

Sean Allen-Hermanson 1
  • 1 Philosophy, Florida International University, 11200 SW 8 street, Miami, USA
Sean Allen-Hermanson
  • Corresponding author
  • Philosophy, Florida International University, 11200 SW 8th street, Miami, Florida, USA
  • Email
  • Search for other articles:
  • degruyter.comGoogle Scholar

Abstract

I criticize Bourget’s intuitive and empirical arguments for thinking that all possible conscious states are underived if intentional. An underived state is one of which it is not the case that it must be realized, at least in part, by intentional states distinct from itself. The intuitive argument depends upon a thought experiment about a subject who exists for only a split second while undergoing a single conscious experience. This, however, trades on an ambiguity in “split second.” Meanwhile, Bourget’s empirical argument is question-begging. My critique also has implications for debates about the essential temporality and unity of consciousness experience, and, phenomenal atomism.

  • Anderson, H.K., and R. Grush. 2009. “A Brief History of Time Consciousness: Historical Precursors to James and Husserl.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 47 (2):277–307.

    • Crossref
    • Export Citation
  • Bayne, T. 2010. The Unity of Consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press.

  • Bourget, D. 2010. “Consciousness Is Underived Intentionality.” Noûs 44 (1):32–58.

    • Crossref
    • Export Citation
  • Burge, T. 1979. “Individualism and the Mental.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4:73–122.

    • Crossref
    • Export Citation
  • Coren, S., L. Ward, and J. Enns. 2004. Sensation and Perception, 6th ed. New York: Wiley & sons.

  • Dainton, B. 2010. “Temporal Consciousness,” Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Accessed August 11, 2013. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-temporal/.

  • Dennett, D.C. 1988. “Evolution, Error and Intentionality.” In Sourcebook on the Foundations of Artificial Intelligence edited by Y. Wilks and D. Partridge, 190–211. Cambridge: New Mexico University Press.

  • Dennett, D.C. 1990. “The Myth of Original Intentionality.” In Modeling the Mind edited by K.A. Mohyeldin Said, W.H. Newton-Smith, R. Viale and K.V. Wilkes, 43–62. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Gray, J. 2002. “The Sound of One Hand Clapping.” Psyche 8 (11).

  • Hill, T.E. 1983. “Ideals of Human Excellence and Preserving Natural Environments.” Environmental Ethics 5:211–224.

    • Crossref
    • Export Citation
  • James, W. 1890. The Principles of Psychology. Dover: New York.

  • Putnam, H. 1975. “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’.” Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131–193.

  • Robbins, P. 2009. “Modularity of Mind,” Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Accessed August 11, 2013. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/modularity-mind/.

  • Van Essen, D.C., and E.A. Deyoe. 1995. “Concurrent Processing in the Primate Visual Cortex.” In The Cognitive Neurosciences edited by M.S. Gazzaniga. Cambridge: The MIT Press.

Purchase article
Get instant unlimited access to the article.
$42.00
Log in
Already have access? Please log in.


or
Log in with your institution

Journal + Issues

Metaphysica provides an international forum of ontology and metaphysics for readers all over the world. The journal is published biannually.

Search