Effizienz oder Gerechtigkeit?

Ungleiche Einkommen, ungleiche Vermögen und Optimale Steuern

  • 1 Center for Macroeconomic Research, Universität zu Köln, Albertus-Magnus-Platz, D-50923 Köln
Felix J. Bierbrauer

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