Discourse and Suppression of Discourse in Damascius’ De principiis

  • 1 Institute for Philosophy “Alexandru Dragomir”, Bd. Mihail Kogalniceanu 49, RO-050104, Bucharest, Romania


This article discusses the three ways of suppression of discourse proposed by Damascius in his treatise De principiis, namely that the absolute principle must not be subject of conception, supposition, or proclamation. I try to show that this triple suppression aims in the end to surpass the ultimate way in which we can still address the absolute One of the Neoplatonic tradition. It is precisely by surpassing discourse in this way that Damascius imposes his own perspective on the absolute principle, the ineffable.

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Publications in Rhizomata cover the full range of ancient philosophy, with special emphasis on the interaction between philosophy and science. Another thematic priority is the influence of ancient philosophy and its interpretation in the later tradition. Supplementing the articles, discussion notes and reviews, the journal also provides bibliographical documentation of recently published important work in the South-East European region.