This paper compares the effectiveness of market discipline mechanisms in the banking sector before and after the 2001 financial crisis in Turkey. It employs an empirical model that incorporates the contemporaneous feedback effects between deposits growth rate and the implicit interest rate. Using 3SLS procedure, the results show that market disciplinary forces in Turkey have been effective both before and after the 2001 financial crisis. The findings show that the effect of the implicit interest rate on deposits becomes more sensitive to bank risk fundamentals after the 2001 financial crisis. Depositors, on the other hand, do not change their behavior in the aftermath of the crisis which can be explained by an implicit too-big-to-fail'' protection at work.
The Review of Middle East Economics and Finance (RMEEF) addresses applied original research in the fields of economics and finance pertaining to the MENA region (Middle East and North Africa), including Turkey and Iran. The journal also publishes articles that deal with the economies of neighboring countries and/or the relationship and interactions between those economies and the MENA region.