Entitlements, good and bad

Nikolaj Jang Linding Pedersen 1
  • 1 University of California Los Angeles. nikolaj@ucla.edu


Crispin Wright has recently introduced a non-evidential notion of warrant, entitlement of cognitive project, as a promising response to certain sceptical arguments that purport to show that we cannot claim any warrant for a wide range of beliefs that we ordinarily take ourselves to possess a warrant for. The basic idea is that, for a given class of cognitive projects, there are certain basic propositions – entitlements – which one is warranted in trusting provided there is no sufficient reason to think them false. Having presented Wright's notion of entitlement and rehearsed the sceptical arguments he invokes the notion to respond to, we proceed to raise what will be referred to as “the generality problem”. The problem raises the question whether entitlements come on the cheap. The good news delivered by entitlement is that it seems to deliver a way of resisting the sceptical conclusion. The bad news, however, is that it also appears to do much more than that by supporting, or providing a foundation for, what we would consider crazy and bizarre cognitive projects.

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This journal promotes current debates in all philosophical topics, historically and systematically. The aim of SATS is that each paper not only adds to these discussions but helps scholars who are not specialists in the specific fields to understand and assess the content of the debates. Thus each paper is reviewed by an ad hoc international expert on the given subject and by an editorial board member.