The Chomskyan revolution in linguistics in the 1950s in essence turned linguistics
into a branch of cognitive science (and ultimately biology) by both changing
the linguistic landscape and forcing a radical change in cognitive science
to accommodate linguistics as many of us conceive of it today. More
recently Chomsky has advanced the boldest version of his naturalistic approach
to language by proposing a Minimalist Program for linguistic theory. In this
article, we wish to examine the foundations of the Minimalist Program and its
antecedents and draw parallelisms with (meta-)methodological foundations in
better-developed sciences such as physics. Once established, such parallelisms,
we argue, help direct inquiry in linguistics and cognitive science/biology and
unify both disciplines.
The Linguistic Review publishes high-quality papers in syntax, semantics, phonology and morphology within a framework of Generative Grammar and related disciplines, as well as critical discussions of theoretical linguistics as a branch of cognitive psychology. The journal welcomes reviews of important new monographs in these areas, dissertation abstracts and letters to the editor.