Rational Choice and Strategic Conflict
The Subjectivistic Approach to Game and Decision Theory
- With a foreword by Steven Brams (NYU)
- New approach to solving strategic conflicts
- This study queried the equilibrium doctrine of game theory
Aims and Scope
This book provides a new approach to game theory. It is well-known that Nash equilibrium produces a number of anomalies (subgame and trembling-hand imperfection, Pareto inefficiency, multiple solutions, etc.), and the epistemic conditions for a rational solution to be a (Nash) equilibrium are quite strong. I argue that an equilibrium is neither necessary nor sufficient for a rational solution if the players act according to subjectivistic decision theory. Moreover, traditional game theory presumes that the players choose their actions or strategies independently. I drop the strategic-independence assumption and introduce the interactive form of a game. The strategic form describes "action," the extensive form describes "reaction," whereas the interactive form is able to describe "interaction." By this means, it is possible to merge non-cooperative with cooperative game theory. The primary audience are all kind of students, graduates, and post graduates interested in a modern and comprehensive approach to game theory.