Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Show Summary Details
Guiding principles for ensuring that central bankers and other unelected policymakers remain stewards of the common good

Tucker, Paul

Unelected Power

The Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the Regulatory State

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

    57,95 € / $65.75 / £51.00*

    eBook (PDF)
    Publication Date:
    2019
    Copyright year:
    2019
    To be published:
    September 2019
    ISBN
    978-0-691-19698-5
    See all formats and pricing

    Overview

    Aims and Scope

    How central banks and independent regulators can support rather than challenge constitutional democracy

    Unelected Power lays out the principles needed to ensure that central bankers and other independent regulators act as stewards of the common good. Blending economics, political theory, and public law, this critically important book explores the necessary conditions for delegated but politically insulated power to be legitimate in the eyes of constitutional democracy and the rule of law. It explains why the solution must fit with how real-world government is structured, and why technocrats and their political overseers need incentives to make the system work as intended. Now with a new preface by Paul Tucker, Unelected Power explains how the regulatory state need not be a fourth branch of government free to steer by its own lights, and how central bankers can emulate the best of judicial self-restraint.

    Details

    656 pages
    PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS
    Language:
    English
    Readership:
    Professional and scholarly;College/higher education;

    More ...

    Paul Tucker is a fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School and chair of the Systemic Risk Council.

    Comments (0)

    Please log in or register to comment.
    Log in