This special issue of *Business and Politics* will examine complex interlinkages between financial intermediaries, risk, and network dynamics in three ways. First, papers will generate an explicitly political conceptualization of financial risk at the firm, industry, national, and global levels. Across these levels, financial actors devise strategies and employ tactics to enhance their political influence based on their understanding of financial risk. As such, the creation and distribution of financial risk reflects, reinforces, and sometimes alters hierarchies of political power across these levels. Second, papers will investigate how network structures in global finance reflect power hierarchies and distribute risk throughout the system. Tied together by promises, trust and financial contracting arrangements, these structures emerge from the relational nature of financial intermediation. Third, papers will explore how the rules of the financial game are characterized by informational asymmetry, risk propagation, Knightian uncertainty, and bounded rationality. Finally, this issue will bring traditional international political economy approaches into a conversation with the Ostrom School of political economy, which emphasizes the possibility of effective polycentric governance of complex systems.

Papers should be no longer than 8,500 words and should be accompanied by a letter to the editors explaining the paper’s relevance to the special issue. Submit your paper using the Business and Politics online submission site: mc manuscri ptcentral.com/dgbap by June 15, 2016. Directions for manuscript preparation can be found at: http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bap. Please direct all inquiries to W. Travis Selmier (wselmier@indiana.edu) and W. Kindred Winecoff (wkwineco@indiana.edu). Publication is slated for Spring, 2017.