I first started thinking about how wars are fought and ended in the mid-1990s. Allan Stam and I were hard at work on our project explaining why democracies win wars, and in 1997 we presented one of the early papers from that project at a special conference on the conduct of war organized by Scott Gartner at the University of California, Davis. Several important papers on the prosecution and termination of war appeared at that conference, including a paper by Hein Goemans (a precursor to his major war-termination book *War and Punishment*), the first in a string of papers connecting wartime casualties to public opinion by Scott Gartner and Gary Segura, a quantitative paper by Suzanne Werner explaining why wars end in absolute or limited outcomes, a quantitative paper by Allan Stam and Scott Bennett on the duration of wars, and one of the earliest theoretical papers explaining bargaining during war by Alastair Smith, among others. Donald Wittman, author of a critical and often underappreciated 1979 *Journal of Conflict* article on war termination, appropriately served as discussant. This collection of papers helped establish and advance the developing theoretical and empirical agenda for understanding how wars are fought, won, and ended.

Around this time, the field was just beginning to realize how powerful the bargaining metaphor is for describing war. Harrison Wagner’s 2000 *American Journal of Political Science* article, which built on James Fearon’s seminal 1995 *International Organization* article, really opened my eyes to the power of thinking about war as a bargaining process. I was invited to a 2001 conference organized by Alastair Smith at Yale on the bargaining model of war, for which I wrote a paper that reviewed the bargaining model of war literature. That conference included a number of important papers by scholars that pushed the boundaries in this area. Some of the same people who were at the 1997 Davis conference attended, plus others such as Robert Powell, Barbara Walter, and William Reed. The 2001 Yale conference produced a number of important papers that went on to be published in top journals and to shape the field. My review paper was probably the least ambitious in the group, and eventually was published in *Perspectives on Politics* in 2003.

It struck me around this time that although the bargaining model of war was enjoying extensive theoretical development, the empirical side was lagging. Do wars actually play out as the bargaining model portrays? My first inclination was to construct a gigantic quantitative dataset of
intrawar behavior, collecting data in particular on the outcomes of battles within wars. I knew that such a project would likely consume hundreds of thousands of dollars in grant money and take several years. However, two problems soon appeared. First, my initial grant requests were rejected. Second, the more I thought about applying quantitative/statistical techniques to tackle this issue, the more I concluded that the applications of such techniques faced serious problems. Most importantly, the data were too messy and wars were too heterogeneous. I recount some of my thinking on these issues in chapter 4 of this book.

I also started to think about the theoretical structure of the bargaining model of war. I scratched out one or two ideas in a paper I presented at a 2003 special conference on military effectiveness hosted by Risa Brooks at Northwestern University. That paper received what can kindly be described as a lukewarm reception, and I switched topics for the next conference in the Northwestern project (I ending up writing a paper on Japanese military effectiveness in World War II; working on that paper helped prepare me to write chapter 10 in this book).

But I kept thinking about the theoretical side of the bargaining model. I went back to the drawing board on theory, and sketched out a few more ideas. I wrote another paper laying out those ideas and then illustrating them with a case study of the American Civil War. I presented that paper at the 2005 meeting of the Peace Science Society (that paper provided some of the foundations for chapter 8 in this book). This paper also attracted little interest, and I began to have doubts about what to do next.

After the Peace Science meeting, I decided that another way to go might be to develop at least one of my theoretical insights within the structure of a formal model. I selected one of the half dozen or so theoretical ideas I had been batting around, and roped a colleague and a graduate student (Cliff Carrubba and Scott Wolford) into coauthoring a paper with me presenting a formal model of the basic theoretical point that fear of a belligerent reneging on a war-ending agreement may affect wartime bargaining behavior (this insight is presented informally in chapter 3 of this book). We presented this paper at the 2006 Midwest Political Science Association meeting and a few other places and spent the next couple of years getting feedback and revising it (as of this writing, the paper is under review for publication). I began to have faith there was an important theoretical point to be made.

However, I could not let go of the empirical side. I was torn. I had long believed that quantitative analysis was the most productive way to test scientific propositions, but my doubts about executing quantitative tests in this area remained substantial. To my great luck, I had coincidentally agreed to teach summer school at Dartmouth College in 2006. While in Hanover, I had several discussions with various members of the faculty
in Dartmouth’s government department about the project, both the theoretical and empirical sides. From my Dartmouth colleagues, I received useful feedback and general encouragement that a case study approach would make a contribution. As is often the case, the most useful advice came here and there, while shooting the breeze in someone’s office, grabbing a hamburger for lunch, or strolling to Fenway Park in Boston. Rein- 

vigorated, I returned to Atlanta that August ready to tear into the project. The bulk of the book gushed out in the 2006–7 academic year. Once I was ready to let go of quantitative tests and really embrace case studies, the pieces quickly fell together. My colleagues at Dartmouth did me another great favor, agreeing to attend a small conference on the first draft of the book manuscript, offering me feedback. The conference took place in summer 2007, and I was again blessed with considerable encouragement, constructive feedback, and ideas for new directions. Around this time, I finished a somewhat related quantitative empirical paper, coauthored with two Emory graduate students, Nigel Lo and Barry Hashimoto. This paper provided quantitative empirical support for the model’s empirical assumption that the imposition of foreign-imposed regime change would significantly decrease the likelihood of war between two former belligerents. We presented this paper at the 2007 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association. It was published in International Organization in 2008.

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I left out various exhortations, notions, original and hortatory allu-
sions, notes, denials; zeal exceeded volume. Such omissions notwithstand-
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Zev Franklin Reiter. When writing this book, I often thought of them and
John Adams’ famous remark, “I must study politics and war that my sons
may have liberty to study mathematics and philosophy. My sons ought
to study mathematics and philosophy, geography, natural history, naval
architecture, navigation, commerce, and agriculture in order to give their
children a right to study painting, poetry, music, architecture, statuary,
tapestry, and porcelain.” I must confess that unlike John Adams I find the
study of politics and war as joyful as the study of poetry, music, or any-
thing else. I wish my sons great luck in finding their own paths to joy.
How Wars End
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